“To ensure imported food safety, federal agencies must focus their resources on high risk foods and coordinate efforts. GAO was asked to (1) assess how Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the U.s> Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) are addressing challenges in overseeing the safety of imported food; (2) assess how FDA leverages resources by working with other entities, such as state and foreign governments; (3) determine how FDA is using its Predictive Risk-Based Evaluation for Dynamic Import Compliance Targeting (PREDICT) system to oversee imported food safety. GAO analyzed CBP, FDA, and FSIS procedures, reports, and regulations and interviewed agency officials and key stakeholders.”
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Food Safety: Agencies Need to Address gaps in Enforcement and Collaboration to Enhance Safety Imported Food
- June 21, 2011
Foot and Mouth Disease – To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues
The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious animal disease can cause to a nation’s economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, the United Kingdom had slaughtered more than 4 million animals and sustained losses of $5 billion in the food and agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses to its tourism industry. Before 2001, the United Kingdom had been FMD-free for almost 34 years. Following the outbreak, the country was generally barred from participating in the international trade of live animals and animal products that could transmit the virus. The United States has adequate processes for obtaining information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and others with this information, but it lacks adequate processes for sharing this information with the Customs Service. The United States receives information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed abroad, international agricultural and animal health organizations, and foreign governments. These officials collect a wide array of agricultural and animal health information about the countries and regions in which they are stationed, which ensures that the United States has timely access to information on foreign FMD outbreaks. However, USDA’s processes for disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks are uneven. U.S. measures to prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to those used by other countries and have kept the United States free of the the disease for 75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk inherent in the ever-increasing volume of international travel and trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA has a two-pronged approach to prevent FMD from reaching U.S. livestock. USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S. borders by helping other countries control and eradicate the disease. USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at ports of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers, and mail do not bring the disease into the United States. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will face several challenges in mounting an effective and quick response, although USDA and many states have developed and tested emergency animal disease response plans.
- March 12, 2012
Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV), Como, Italy & Bradford Disarmament Research Centre (BDRC), University of Bradford, November 2008.
By G. Manchini & J. Revill
This report is the result of an investigation which aimed to investigate the extent to which biosecurity education is included in academic curricula in life sciences higher education in Europe, but also to develop an understanding of the attitudes of life science educators towards such education. The report is thus intended to help answer some of the questions that surround biosecurity education, and posit some possible responses to the challenges of implementing such education for life sciences students.
- May 2, 2011
Executive Order 13292
Signed: March 25, 2003
Federal Register: 68 FR 15313, March 28, 2003
While Executive Order 12958 established that scientific matters not be considered for classification unless it relates to national security, Executive Order 13292 extended that consideration to include scientific matters relating to defense against transnational terrorism.
- March 23, 2003
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan held a meeting on Future Opportunities for U.S.-Uzbekistan Cooperation in the Life Sciences in September 2012. The meeting focused on broad disciplinary areas within the environmental, agricultural, and human health sciences.
The workshop included scientific presentations from Uzbek scientists and their U.S. counterparts, and interactive discussion among all participants to identify potential collaborative areas of mutual interest and benefit. Past achievements and on-going programs that were highlighted during the workshop prompted participants’ eagerness to pursue collaborative opportunities identified during the discussions.
- April 11, 2013