Biological Defense Research Reporting Act

House Bill H. R. 3758 Introduced to House: November 28, 1989 Sponsor: Representative George Gekas [PA-17] Status: Reported by Committee December 4, 1989. A bill to to amend title 10, United States Code, to require operators of facilities that conduct biological defense research to provide notification and related information to police, hospitals, and fire departments.

Biological Laboratories: Design and Implementation Considerations for Safety Reporting System

“As the number of biological labs increases, so too do the safety risks for lab workers. Data on these risks—collected through a safety reporting system (SRS) from reports of hazards, incidents, and accidents—can support safety efforts. However, no such system exists for all biological labs, and a limited system applies to only a subset of these labs. While a national SRS has been proposed, design and implementation are complex. GAO was asked to identify lessons and suggest design and implementation considerations for a labwide SRS.”

Author:
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Publish Date:
September 2010

Biological Research – Observations on DHS’s Analyses Concerning Whether FMD Research Can Be Done as Safely on the Mainland as on Plum Island

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is the most highly infectious animal disease known: nearly 100 percent of exposed animals become infected with it. Although the United States has not had an outbreak of FMD since 1929, a single outbreak of FMD virus as a result of an accidental or intentional release from a laboratory on the U.S. mainland could have significant consequences for U.S. agriculture. The traditional approach to the disease, once infection is confirmed, is to depopulate infected and potentially infected livestock herds to eradicate the disease. The value of U.S. livestock sales was $140 billion in 2007; about 10 percent of this figure, or approximately $13 billion, was accounted for by export markets. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), on a federally owned island off the northern tip of Long Island, New York, is the only facility in the United States that studies the live FMD virus. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) was responsible for the PIADC from its opening in the 1950s until June 2003, when USDA transferred responsibility for it to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The act specified that USDA would continue to have access to Plum Island to conduct diagnostic and research work on foreign animal diseases, and it authorized the president to transfer funds from USDA to DHS to operate the PIADC.

Author:
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Publish Date:
July 2009

Biological Safety Training Programs as a Component of Personnel Reliability

Two units of AAAS—the Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy and the Program on Scientific Freedom, Responsibility and Law – have conducted a study of existing biosafety training programs. To address these goals, we convened a group of experts in biosafety, the life sciences, biosecurity, and relevant stakeholders (e.g., architects and engineers), on March 17, 2009 at AAAS to review biosafety training programs and to provide recommendations on how best to design and implement similar programs. With the help of workshop participants, we identified twenty biosafety training programs.

This workshop is one of four workshops on biosecurity education; the first workshop, held on November 21, 2008, addressed education on dual use research for scientists, and the next two workshops will address public health preparedness and biodefense policy.

Author:
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
Publish Date:
March 2009

Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989

The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act (BWAT) implements the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and protects the United States from biological terrorism by prohibiting certain conduct pertaining to biological weapons, including knowingly developing, producing, stockpiling, transfering, acquiring, retaining, or possessing any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assisting a foreign state or any organization.

Author:
101st Congress of the United States of America
Publish Date:
May 22 1990