Evaluation of the Updated Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas

Safeguarding U.S. agriculture from foreign animal diseases and protecting our food system require cutting-edge research and diagnostic capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have embarked on an important mission to replace the aging Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) with a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). When operational, this new facility would be the world’s fourth biosafety level-4 laboratory capable of large animal research. It would serve as a critical world reference laboratory for identifying emerging and unknown disease threats, and would thus be a critical asset in securing the future health, wealth, and security of the nation.

Author:
Committee on the Evaluation of the Updated Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas; Board on Life Sciences; Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Research Council
Publish Date:
June 2012

Executive Order 11850–Renunciation of certain uses in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents

Through this executive order, the US renounced first use of herbicides in war except for controlling vegetation around within and around US bases, installations, and their defensive perimeter. The US also renounced first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military mode to save lives in certain specific situations.

Author:
Richard Nixon (published in National Archives)
Publish Date:
Apr 8 1975

Executive Summary: Diagnostics for Global Biosurveillance

“The discovery of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic and the emergence of other diseases such as SARS have highlighted the important role that diagnostic tools can play in improving the surveillance of infectious disease threats at the population level. Experiences with these events have shown that recognition of outbreaks, management of epidemics, and development of countermeasures can depend heavily on having access to highly specific surveillance information that is typically obtained from testing clinical specimens. Consequently, the rising threat of emerging diseases and concern about biological weapons has led to an emphasis in governments on improving laboratory and diagnostic capacity in order to improve global biosurveillance for infectious diseases.”

Author:
Jennifer B. Nuzzo, Kunal J. Rambhia, Samuel B. Wollner, Amesh A. Adalja, Eric Toner, Anita Cicero, and Thomas V. Inglesby
Publish Date:
September 2011

Fact Sheet – Biological

Biological agents are organisms or toxins that can kill or incapacitate people, livestock and crops. The three basic groups of biological agents that would likely be used as weapons are bacteria, viruses and toxins. Most biological agents are difficult to grow and maintain. Many break down quickly when exposed to sunlight and other environmental factors, while others, such as anthrax spores, are very long lived. Biological agents can be dispersed by spraying them into the air, by infecting animals that carry the disease to humans and by contaminating food and water.

Author:
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Publish Date:
June 2007

Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2010-FY2011

Since 2001, the United States government has spent substantial resources on preparing the nation against a bioterrorist attack. Earlier articles in this series have analyzed civilian biodefense funding by the federal government for fiscal years (FY) 2001 through FY2010. This article updates those figures with budgeted amounts for FY2011, specifically analyzing the budgets and allocations for biodefense at the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Commerce, and State; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the National Science Foundation.

Author:
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
Publish Date:
June 2010