The Definition of Measurement of Dangerous Research

“Both scientists and policy-makers are increasingly recognizing the potential and pitfalls of biotechnology in regards to biosecurity. The spread of biotechnology and biological research across the globe is revealing a great deal of information on the origins of human disease and microbial pathogenesis. There is great hope that the genetic, proteomic, and metabolomic information will yield new antimicrobial and immunological therapies and vaccines in upcoming years. However, continued research into disease pathogenesis also has the potential to cause more harm than good without proper oversight. Although such a negative experimental outcome has not manifested itself yet, recent experiments into mouse host susceptibility to an engineered strain of mousepox and a smallpox complement inhibitor have pointed the way toward the need for greater debate, if not oversight, of scientific research into high-threat pathogens.”
By Alex Greninger

Author:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Publish Date:
2004

The Global Forum on Biorisks

This report, published by The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), introduces The Global Forum on Biorisks—a “comprehensive, integrated, international, and multisectoral approach to dissuading, mitigating, interdicting, countering, and responding to biological threats of natural, accidental, or intentional origin.

Author:
Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS)
Publish Date:
December 2009

The Industrialization of Biology and Its Impact on National Security

Summary of Findings: The Center conducted a horizon-scanning project to provide senior leaders from the United States and the United Kingdom with awareness and understanding of the medium-term future of biotechnology and biological dangers, resulting strategic concerns for homeland and national security, and possible approaches that both countries may take to address biological dangers.”

by Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Ryan Morhard, Kunal Rambhia, Anita Cicero, and Tom Inglesby

Author:
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
Publish Date:
Jun 21 2012

The National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, issued by President G.W. Bush, tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-theart agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house highbiocontainment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest.

The DHS plans regarding the NBAF raise several policy issues. Concerns about safety and security, previously expressed about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being voiced about NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as prioritization and investment in agricultural biodefense, may be reassessed if more highcontainment laboratory space becomes available.

Author:
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Publish Date:
December 2009

The Project BioShield Act: Issues for the 112th Congress

“In 2004, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act (P.L. 108-276) to provide the federal government with new authorities related to the development, procurement, and use of medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents. As the expiration of some of these authorities approaches, Congress is considering whether these authorities have sufficiently contributed to national preparedness to merit extension. “

Author:
Frank Gottron, Congressional Research Services
Publish Date:
Oct 26 2012