NIAID Strategic Plan for Biodefense Research

The threat of bioterrorism has created new challenges for medicine and public health. Our nation’s ability to detect and respond to acts of bioterror requires new and improved countermeasures, including diagnostics, vaccines, and therapies. The development of countermeasures is driven by biomedical research on disease-causing microbes and on the immune system response to these pathogens. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and NIAID support much of this research.

As the lead agency at NIH for infectious diseases and immunology research, NIAID has developed:
The NIAID Strategic Plan for Biodefense Research was published in 2002 and was followed by two research agendas, one for Category A agents and another for Category B and C priority pathogens. This early plan focused on the importance of basic research, as well as applying that basic research to developing products such as diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. It also highlighted specific scientific gaps associated with priority pathogens. The plan and agendas acknowledged the importance of working with partners in the private and public sectors and collaborating with other agencies and organizations to ensure that the fruits of basic research would be rapidly translated into products. The principles on which these documents were based continue to hold true.

United States Department of Health & Human Services
Publish Date:
2007 Update

Nonfederal Capabilities Should Be Considered in Creating a National Biosurveillance Strategy

The nation is at risk for a catastrophic biological event. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act directed GAO to report on biosurveillance–to help detect and respond to such events–at multiple jurisdictional levels. In June 2010, GAO recommended that the National Security Staff lead the development of a national biosurveillance strategy, which is now under development. This report focuses on nonfederal jurisdictions, which own many of the resources that support a national capability. It discusses (1) federal support for state and local biosurveillance; (2) state and local challenges; (3) federal support and challenges for tribal and insular areas and (4) federal assessments of nonfederal capabilities.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Publish Date:
October 31, 2011

North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was the first public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) declared under the International Health Regulations (2005) [IHR (2005)] and the first influenza pandemic in more than 40 years. Canada, Mexico, and the United States recognize that the risk of another pandemic has not diminished and that the world faces an ongoing threat posed by the emergence and spread of influenza viruses with the potential to cause a human influenza pandemic. The three countries continue to work together to strengthen their preparedness in anticipation of a highly contagious influenza virus or other pandemic either originating in or spread to this continent.

Canada, Mexico, and the United States
Publish Date:
April 2, 2012

North Carolina State Biological Agent Registry

SESSION LAW 2001-469
Passed: January 10, 2002

In response to the potential threat of biological terrorism (BT) the North Carolina General Assembly passed a law that requires the registration of potentially dangerous biological agents. This legislation was enacted because of the recent anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001. Effective January 10, 2002, the State of North Carolina now requires that organizations or individuals who possess and maintain a biological agent listed as select agents in Federal Register 42 C.F.R. Part 72 to notify the Office of the North Carolina BT Coordinator.

The information that is reported to the BT Coordinator for the Biological Agents Registry will be strictly confidential and can only be released by order of the State Health Director upon a finding that the release is necessary for the conduct of a disease investigation or for the investigation of a release, theft or loss of a biological agent.

NSABB Recommendation Regarding Review of Revised Manuscripts on Transmissibility of A/H5N1 Influenza Virus.

Full Recommendations of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity Regarding its March 29-30, 2012 Meeting to Review Revised Manuscripts on Transmissibility of A/H5N1 Influenza Virus.

Publish Date:
April 15, 2012