Survey Report, 2009.
By Masamichi Minehata (BDRC) & Nariyoshi Shinomiya (NDMC)
Employing a survey methodology, the National Defense Medical College in Japan and the University of Bradford in the UK investigated the current state of biosecurity education in Japanese universities. This paper reports on the results of this survey and represents an introductory attempt to investigate the topic by sampling a limited number of universities in Japan.
“Although the words “biosecurity” and “biosafety” are sometimes used interchangeably, they differ fundamentally in that biosecurity policies counter deliberate attempts to acquire bioweapon capabilities, while biosafety measures prevent accidental infections or release dangerous organisms and toxins. However, some biosecurity measures do overlap with policies on biosafety, agricultural security, biodiversity, and counter-terrorism. Without standardized measures applied worldwide, terrorists could exploit unprotected or at least protected facilities to gain access to toxins and pathogens, and then use the material for bioweapon attacks in far-distant locations.”
By Michael Michael Barletta
Research Report for the Wellcome Trust Project on `Building a Sustainable Capacity in Dual-use Bioethics`
By Chandre Gould
“It is a matter of record that over the past ten years there has been increased focus within the setting of international relations upon how to ensure that technological developments in the life sciences are not used by individuals, groups or states to endanger public health and security (Rappert 2009). Indeed, it has become accepted in the international discourse on biosecurity that a range of national and international measures is necessary to reduce the risk of biological weapons development and use. These measures include strengthening international and national norms and controls as well as raising scientists’ awareness of their own responsibility to be knowledgeable about national and international rules and obligations. The International Committee of the Red Cross coined the term ‘web of prevention’ to refer to the diverse measures to reduce risk, a term that has since gained increasing currency (Rappert and McLeish 2007). States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention have responded to the risk posed by biological weapons development by implementing measures that include, but not limited to…”
“Bioterrorism, once a largely hypothetical threat, became a harsh reality in the fall of 2001 when letters containing a fine powder of dried anthrax spores were sent through the U.S. mail, infecting twenty-two people and killing five. Despite the fact that the attacks involved only about ten grams of powdered anthrax, the ripple effects temporarily disrupted all three branches of federal government, closed down congressional offices and mail processing stations, and frightened millions of Americans. These far-reaching consequences hinted at mayhem that could result from the large-scale release of a “weaponized” disease agent. Although, improved disease surveillance and new vaccines and their therapeutic drugs are clearly needed to combat bioterrorism, it is also essential to make it more difficult for terrorists or criminals to obtain deadly pathogens and toxins.”
By Jonathan B. Tucker
Biosecurity in Scandinavia
This article investigates the extent to which biosecurity measures are recognized and have been implemented in the Nordic countries, in the absence of formalized security standards and legislation. Two trials were undertaken: first, a broad combined biosafety and biosecurity questionnaire survey of the Nordic countries, and, second, a focused on-site audit of 22 facilities, with 94 laboratories, in Denmark. Both trials indicated that external security had been partially implemented but that little attention had been paid to internal security and the establishment of biosecurity. It was demonstrated that the backgrounds and identities of insiders were rarely checked and that they could have gained access to both pathogen inventory lists and freezers in many facilities. In 81% of pathogen-containing facilities, pathogens were not routinely and centrally accounted for. The authors recommend the establishment of a legal framework congruent with international standards and obligations; novel governmental national biosecurity authorities, requiring a fusion of both microbiological and technical expertise and legislative powers; and the formulation of a new code of conduct termed “Good Biosecurity Practice.”
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