Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk

The authors of this document have developed a “mathematical model of a cows-to-consumers supply chain associated with a single milk-processing facility that is the victim of a deliberate release of botulinum toxin. Because centralized storage and processing lead to substantial dilution of the toxin, a minimum amount of toxin is required for the release to do damage. Irreducible uncertainties regarding the dose-responding curve present us from quantifying the minimum effective release. However, if terrorists can obtain enough toxin, and this may well be possible, then rapid distribution and consumption result in several hundred thousand poisoned individuals if detection from early symptomatics is not timely.”
By Lawrence M. Wein and Yifan Liu

Author:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISC)
Publish Date:
2005

Animal Models for Assessing Countermeasures to Bioterrorism Agents

The Transformational Medical Technologies (TMT) has been a unique component of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) medical biodefense efforts since 2006. Its mission is to advance countermeasure research and development in support of the broader goal of the DoD to protect warfighters from emerging infectious diseases and future genetically engineered biological weapons. The TMT, using advanced science and technology approaches, focused on the development of roadspectrum countermeasures that target common host and pathogen pathways or enhance the host’s immune response. Many of these pathogens are lethal or cause such debilitating diseases in humans that it is ethically inappropriate to test the efficacy of these countermeasures in human volunteers. In lieu of human participants, these products may be tested in animals and approved for human use under the provisions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s 2002 Animal Rule. The reliance on animal models for the development and licensure of medical countermeasures against biothreats is challenging for a number of reasons.

The ad hoc Committee on Animal Models for Assessing Countermeasures to Bioterrorism Agents prepared a consensus report that would address the challenges stemming from developing and testing medical countermeasures against biothreat agents in animal models. Animal Models for Assessing Countermeasures to Bioterrorism Agents evaluates how well the existing TMT-employed or candidate animal models reflect the pathophysiology, clinical picture, and treatment of human disease as related to the agents of interest. The report addresses the process and/or feasibility of developing new animal models for critical biodefense research, placing emphasis on the need for a robust and expeditious validation process in terms of the FDA’s Animal Rule. The report also evaluates alternatives to the use of animal models based on the premise of the Three Rs.

Author:
Committee on Animal Models for Assessing Countermeasures to Bioterrorism Agents; National Research Council
Publish Date:
December, 2011

Anthrax Countermeasures: Current Status and Future Needs

“The U.S. government does not yet have the range of medical-countermeasures needed to protect its citizens from anthrax and other potential bioweapons. In the event of an anthrax attack, treatment interventions in addition to antibiotics would be needed so that very ill patients can be treated and clean-up crews can be better protected, especially if an engineered strain is used. This article describes specific anthrax countermeasures that are in development, barriers to development, and potential mechanisms the government could use to accelerate the movement of these countermeasures through the pipeline. A key challenge will be to encourage the transition of promising leads from basic research to the product development stage, when they may qualify for BioShield funds.”
By Luciana L. Borio and Gigi Kwik Gronvall

Author:
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
Publish Date:
2005

Anthrax in humans and animals (4th ed.)

Anthrax essentially ceased to be regarded as a disease of major health or economic importance after the enormous successes of Max Sterne’s veterinary vaccine developed in the 1930s, and subsequent analogs in the former Soviet union, in dramatically reducing the incidence of the disease in livestock throughout the world in the ensuing two decades. the 1980s saw a resurgence of interest in the disease, partly stimulated by a renewed focus on Bacillus anthracis, the agent of anthrax, as a potential agent for a biological weapon, after the largest reported outbreak of human inhalational anthrax that took place in 1979 in the city then called Sverdlovsk (now ekaterinburg) in the former Soviet union, and partly because of increasing recognition that anthrax had by no means “gone away” as a naturally occurring disease in animals and humans in many countries…

Author:
World Health Organization (WHO)
Publish Date:
2008

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act “deter[s] terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes.” According to the Congressional Research Service Summary, the law makes threatening, attempting, or conspiring to use a biological weapon a federal crime; broadens the definition of biological weapons to include components of infectious substances, toxic materials, and recombinant molecules; and authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to regulate how biological agents are to be identified as potential threats and how they are to be transferred.

Author:
United States Congress
Publish Date:
Apr 24 1996