Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law

The Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law (JBBBL) offers both a legal and scientific perspective on current issues concerning bioterrorism, public health and safety, and national security. Edited by an international board of leading scholars from all the continents, our journal is aware that bioterrorism related issues are global problems. Our goal is to develop a unique international community of legal scholars, scientists and policy experts who will address current issues in these fields.

In working with both the legal and scientific community, we have identified a need for enhanced communication and research between lawmakers and biodefense researchers and safety officers concerning regulations governing Select Agents, and a knowledge gap in the fields of biosafety, biosecurity and biodefense law. This journal bridges that gap by creating a timely, peer-reviewed forum available to the legal community, healthcare professionals, biodefense researchers, scientists and biosafety officers.

Author:
Center for Biodefense, Law and Public Policy
Publish Date:
July 2012

JSPS-ESRC Seminar Series, Dual-Use Education for Life Scientists: Mapping the Current Global Landscape and Developments: Seminar Report

Research Report for the Wellcome Trust Project on `Building a Sustainable Capacity in Dual-use Bioethics`
By J. Sture and M. Minehata

Our aim in producing this report on the meeting in Bradford, UK, in July 2010 is three-fold. Firstly, we aim to provide an account of the presentations given, thereby offering an overview of the current international situation in regard to dual use bioethics and biosecurity education. Secondly, we aim to provide an introduction to the principal issues that face stakeholder communities when faced with the need for education and awareness-raising in terms of dual use risks. Thirdly, we aim to provide a number of conclusions and recommendations for the higher education and the life science communities, as well as the policy-making community, in the hope that these will be of practical use and assistance to ongoing international efforts to support the full implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We hope, therefore, that this report will not only offer an account of the Bradford meeting, but that it will also serve as an introductory overview to the current context for those readers who are unfamiliar with the subject.

Author:
University of Bradford
Publish Date:
December 2010

Laboratory Creation of a Highly Transmissible H5N1 Influenza Virus: Balancing Substantial Risks and Real Benefits

Controversy erupted when influenza researchers announced that they had created an H5N1 influenza virus that was transmissible between ferrets. The controversy escalated when the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommended that the work be published but recommended significant voluntary redactions. The responses to the NSABB action and to the research itself have been polarized. A readily transmitted H5N1 virus could be extraordinarily lethal; therefore, the risk for accidental release is significant, and deliberate misuse of the data to create a biological weapon is possible. However, the knowledge gained by these and future experiments under appropriate safeguards is likely to allow critical understanding of influenza transmission and virulence. It would be irresponsible to adopt either extreme solution: to prevent and censor the research or to allow unlimited distribution without careful review by an independent group, such as the NSABB.

Author:
Andrew T. Pavia, MD, University of Utah
Publish Date:
January 26, 2012

Laboratory Security and Emergency Response Guidance for Laboratories Working with Select Agents

In recent years, concern has increased regarding use of biologic materials as agents of terrorism, but these same agents are often necessary tools in clinical and research microbiology laboratories. Traditional biosafety guidelines for laboratories have emphasized use of optimal work practices, appropriate containment equipment, well-designed facilities, and administrative controls to minimize risk of worker injury and to ensure safeguards against laboratory contamination.   Read More »

Author:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Publish Date:
December 2002

Law and Science drive technology in the war against bioterrorism

Abstract — The U.S. approach to defense against bioterrorism is being done largely within existing legal frameworks and in response to new laws that address this challenge—rather than technology driving the development of law. While the biotechnology revolution has resulted in a wide range of biodefense applications, these can only be applied within existing constitutional restraints and statutory frameworks. Numerous examples demonstrate that technology cannot be used where it threatens the legal foundations of our society, and technology is now being challenged to come up with more rule-sensitive approaches. In other approaches, such as research priorities, progress toward an effective biodefense would be better served by prioritizing research according to scientific organizing principles. However, the constraints of the rule of law also provide security in times of threat to our domestic safety, and these rules will continue to shape technologies to fit within those constraints. In order to reach the next level in biodefense, we must understand the relationship between biotechnology and law in order to be effective in a biodefense context. © 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Citation: Law and Science drive technology in the war against bioterrorism, Technology in Society 26 (2004) 287- 301. This was an invited article for the Silver Anniversary Issue, and proposes that in some cases – in biodefense – law has been shaping technologies within the constraints of our legal framework.

Author:
Texas Tech University
Publish Date:
2004