The United States regulates more than 80 human, animal, and plant pathogens as part of the Select Agent Program,1 imposing strict controls on access by U.S. researchers and laboratories. However, almost all of these pathogens are also found in nature. The map associated with this article depicts the countries in which select agent pathogens caused disease between January 1, 2009, and October 31, 2010. Although pathogen security measures justifiably have been strengthened since 2001, the widespread natural occurrence of these pathogens indicates an inherent limitation of the regulations.
Volume 9, Number 1, 2011 © Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. DOI: 10.1089/bsp.2011.0321
- Author:
- Center for Biosecurity of UPMC
- Publish Date:
- March 2011
The threat posed by infectious diseases has been increasingly framed as a security issue. The UN Security Council’s Resolution 1308, which designated HIV/AIDS as a threat to international security, evidenced the securitization process. Using securitization theory as a theoretical tool, this article explores the securitization of infectious diseases in the World Health Organization (WHO). While WHO has tended to securitize infectious diseases since 2000, it has encountered a dilemma in the process because of the inherent asymmetry of interest between developed and developing countries. The act of securitization in WHO currently remains mostly a rhetorical device, since WHO’s norms emblematic of securitization have not been backed by operational measures for verification or enforcement due to these asymmetric interests.
- Author:
- Jiyong Jin and Joe Thomas Karackattu
- Publish Date:
- May 25, 2011
The current H1N1 pandemic highlights the threat posed to our nation by an influenza pandemic. The previous administration’s Homeland Security Council (HSC) issued the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (Plan) in May 2006 to help address a pandemic. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to (1) determine how the HSC and responsible federal agencies monitor the progress and completion of the Plan’s action items; and (2) assess the extent to which selected action items have been completed. To do this, GAO interviewed officials from the HSC and the six federal agencies responsible for implementing most of the Plan, and analyzed a random sample of 60 action items. While this report does not assess the response efforts for the H1N1 pandemic, GAO continues to monitor the outbreak and the federal response.
- Author:
- U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- Publish Date:
- November - 2009
- March 12, 2012
- | Filed under North America, Report, and 2001-2025
The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic was the first human pandemic in over four decades, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that there were as many as 89 million U.S. cases. Over $6 billion was available for the response, led by the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS), with coordination provided by the Homeland Security Council (HSC) through its National Security Staff (NSS). In particular, HHS’s CDC worked with states and localities to communicate with the public and to distribute H1N1 vaccine and supplies. GAO was asked (1) how HHS used the funding, (2) the key issues raised by the federal response, and (3) the actions taken to identify and incorporate lessons learned. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from five states about their interaction with the federal government. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed officials from HHS, DHS, the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), NSS, and others, such as associations.
- Author:
- U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- Publish Date:
- June 27, 2011
- February 3, 2012
- | Filed under North America, Report, and 2001-2025
Infection Prevention in Points of Dispensing
“Community-based points of dispensing (POD) will be used during disasters to distribute mass quantities of anti-infective therapy/prophylaxis and/or vaccination to an entire community in a short period of time. Without proper planning, staff training, and implementation of infection prevention strategies, disease transmission is possible in PODs. The purpose of this paper is to outline infection prevention recommendations for PODs. : Infection prevention in PODs is important to prevent communicable disease spread. This article can assist emergency managers in developing an infection prevention program for PODs.”
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